End-to-End Security and Privacy Model

Authra is engineered with a security-first and privacy-first mindset, knowing that users and enterprises will only embrace the system if they trust both the data and the data handling processes. We outline here how Authra secures data from device to blockchain, protects user privacy, and aligns with regulatory compliance requirements.

Device Security & Data Authenticity: Every data point in Authra (be it a latency measurement or a location claim) starts at a user’s device. We leverage smartphone Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) – e.g., Android StrongBox or ARM TrustZone, and the iOS Secure Enclave – to cryptographically sign measurements at the source. The TruePing app generates key pairs that reside in the TEE, meaning the private key never leaves the secure enclave. When the app collects a PoP or QoE datapoint, it computes a digital signature using that key. The signature (and an embedded device attestation, when available) proves that:

• The data came from a genuine device’s sensors (not a modified app or emulator), and

• The data was not altered in transit (any tampering would invalidate the signature).

Validators reject any data that isn’t properly signed by a known device key. This mechanism turns each phone into a secure witness, providing what is essentially a witness testimony that can be independently verified. If malware or a malicious user attempted to fake or modify the data, the cryptographic checks would fail and the network would discard the submission.

Transport Security: Data in transit from the TruePing app to Authra’s network is end-to-end encrypted. We use TLS with certificate pinning on the app, so that the app only communicates with authentic Authra servers/nodes and cannot be easily intercepted or redirected by man-in-the-middle attacks. This protects against eavesdropping or injection of false data during transmission. Additionally, proofs are typically small payloads (a few hundred bytes), which makes it feasible for the app to even use mixnets or TOR for higher anonymity in the future, though currently TLS is sufficient.

Network security (Orbit optimistic rollup): Authra runs as an Arbitrum Orbit L3 on Nitro. Safety derives from BoLD fraud proofs anchored to Ethereum: one honest challenger is sufficient to prevent finalization of invalid state; economic finality follows the parent chain’s challenge window. The active sequencer posts a governance-set bond in $ATRX and is subject to slashing/rotation on misbehavior; challengers post per-challenge bonds, earn rewards for valid disputes, and forfeit on spam. Censorship resistance is preserved via Delayed Inbox force-inclusion. AnyTrust DA provides low fees with a transparent, rotating DAC; if quorum degrades or stricter assurance is required, we fallback to Rollup (on-chain DA). At the application layer, TEE-signed, multi-signal proofs, anomaly detection, and Sybil controls make attacks costly and detectable; core contracts and ops undergo regular third-party audits and red-team tests.

Zero-Trust and Auditability: Authra’s philosophy aligns with zero-trust principles. Every layer verifies the layer below – devices don’t trust users, network doesn’t trust devices without attestation, enterprises don’t have to trust Authra’s team because they can audit the cryptographic proofs on-chain. Every proof recorded on Authra is auditable end-to-end. A verifier can (i) check the on-device signature and attestation artifact, (ii) confirm inclusion by the Authra L3 sequencer or submit via the Delayed Inbox for censorship-resistant force-inclusion after the governance-configured window, and (iii) rely on Arbitrum BoLD permissionless fraud proofs for correctness and on parent-chain (Arbitrum One → Ethereum) finality for settlement. This provides objective evidence without requiring trust in any single party, while preserving liveness under adverse conditions.

Finality timeline: T₀: included by sequencer (seconds) → T₀+W: force-inclusion window closes → Dispute window on parent chain per BoLD → Settlement finality on Ethereum L1.  

Privacy by Design: Because Authra deals with potentially sensitive data (location and network usage), we have built privacy safeguards into the core design:

• Data Minimization: We collect only the data needed for the service. For PoP, the app gathers an environmental “fingerprint” (nearby cell IDs, WiFi SSIDs hashed, etc.) and a coarse GPS location, rather than continuous precise tracking  . The WiFi network names, for example, can be hashed so that the actual names (which might include personal info like “John’s Wifi”) are not stored – only a non-reversible hash used for matching. GPS coordinates can be quantized to a grid or truncated to 2-3 decimal places, which is enough to prove general location (within tens of meters) but not pinpoint an exact address. QoE metrics are just numbers (latency, signal strength) without content. We deliberately avoid collecting any payload data (no actual user communications or personal files are touched – only network performance metadata).

• Pseudonymization: Users are not asked for name, email, phone number or any identity when using TruePing. Each user is represented by a pseudonymous crypto address or an app-specific user ID that has no real-world identifier attached. On-chain, data proofs are associated only with these pseudonymous device IDs or wallet addresses. This means even if someone scans the public ledger, they see contributions from address 0xABC but have no idea who that is in real life. The mapping of a device’s data to a personal identity is never stored by Authra.

• Aggregated Exposure: When Authra pprovides data to enterprises via Terrascient, it is in aggregate form. A dashboard might show “20 devices experienced <5 Mbps speed in Area A this morning” or a heatmap of coverage – it does not expose individual user trajectories or histories. Raw detailed logs are kept internal and even there they are identified by device IDs, not names.

• On-Chain Privacy: The blockchain only stores hashed commitments and high-level proofs, not raw location coordinates or IP addresses. In fact, our use of an L2 for anchoring means even the public record on Ethereum is just a hash of a batch – completely opaque without access to the off-chain data and keys.

• Post-Quantum Cryptography: This is a public overview for the PQC Migration. We publish a modular cryptography roadmap: today Ed25519; next hybrid signatures (Ed25519 + PQ scheme such as Dilithium/Falcon as libraries stabilize); eventual PQC-only for device and batch signatures. Verifier tools and compatibility harnesses are open so third parties can audit transitions. Hybrid (Ed25519+PQC) signatures will be accepted for device attestations and batch commitments as libraries mature, without requiring on-chain key changes. Key sizes, curves, and rollout cadence are shared under NDA. 

• Privacy-preserving primitives: We employ k-anonymity grids, hash-based environment fingerprints, and selective-reveal (ZK-ready) attestations so verifiers can check that a presence proof is valid without learning precise coordinates or identities. Parameters and ZK circuit details are provided under NDA.

• Precision Presence (RTK optional): For high-assurance use-cases (SLAs/defense/fraud), validators may request RTK-enhanced presence claims. Authra integrates third-party GNSS correction feeds to achieve sub-meter accuracy on supported devices/regions. Claims carry RTK artifacts server-verified against corrections; default proofs remain multi-signal GNSS+RF without RTK. Precision mode is opt-in, policy-gated, and logged in provenance.

• Soft Presence via Background BLE: As an option, we can opt for retail/events footfall and venue corroboration (not primary PoP), TruePing can opportunistically log privacy-preserving BLE encounters in the vicinity to support visit/attendance inferences. iOS background limits and privacy rules are respected; BLE signals only corroborate network proofs and never substitute for primary Presence.

User Control and Consent: TruePing only operates with user consent. On install, the app explicitly asks for permission to access location and run diagnostics, explaining that the data will be anonymized and used for network quality mapping (in line with app store guidelines and privacy laws). Users can pause data collection at any time via a simple toggle in the app (of course, pausing means they stop earning rewards during that time). They can also choose to only collect data under certain conditions – for example, only while on WiFi or only during daytime – using in-app settings . For transparency, users have access to their own contributed data: the app provides a personal dashboard of their recent reports (latency, coverage, etc.) and even allows exporting those records if desired. If a user decides to stop permanently, they can delete their account; this erases any keys on the device and stops any further collection. (Any data already aggregated on-chain remains as part of the global dataset, but it’s unlinkable to them and is essentially anonymous facts at that point). This approach is in line with GDPR principles like right to withdraw consent and right of access, although strictly speaking the data we store isn’t personally identifiable. By proactively giving users control, we build trust and also compliance “as default.”

Enterprise-Grade Compliance: From day one, Authra has aimed to meet or exceed the compliance standards that enterprises and governments require.

• We are implementing SOC 2 Type I/II controls for all cloud services (e.g., the TruePing backend, Terrascient cloud platform). This involves formalizing policies for security, availability, and confidentiality – things like rigorous access control, continuous monitoring, encrypted databases, routine backups, and incident response plans. An independent auditor will verify these controls, giving enterprise customers confidence in the operational security of the Authra service.

• For handling personal data, we align with GDPR and similar regulations (CCPA, etc.). Our privacy-by-design approach (minimization, pseudonymity) means we avoid creating personal data in most cases. Where we do handle user information (like email if a user provides one for notifications, or support), those are handled per GDPR guidelines (consent, purpose limitation, etc.). We also plan for data processing agreements and clear terms of service to clarify data usage.

• For serving U.S. government clients, we target FedRAMP Moderate equivalence. This means if a government agency wants to use Authra (particularly Terrascient), we can deploy it in a GovCloud or their on-premises environment with all required NIST 800-53 controls implemented. Terrascient in a government context would run with single-tenant isolation, FIPS-140 validated encryption modules, multi-factor authentication, and audit logging enabled. In short, we strive to tick the boxes for regulatory compliance, making it as easy as possible for conservative organizations to adopt Authra without legal or policy roadblocks.

• Recognizing that our technology (especially presence verification) could be considered dual-use, we are attentive to export controls like ITAR. We structure the project entities and share software in a way that avoids violating export regulations, and if needed will obtain licenses for certain collaborations.

• Globally, we will engage with local regulators to ensure our token reward system and data collection approach is acceptable (for example, clarifying that users explicitly opt in to share anonymized telemetry in exchange for tokens, analogously to existing crowd-sourcing apps, which is permitted in most jurisdictions).

• Standards Interop (Passpoint/OpenRoaming): Authra issues Passpoint/OpenRoaming profiles so TruePing credentials can function as standards-compliant Wi-Fi roaming identities. This yields richer, privacy-preserving telemetry (association/roam success/failure, handoff quality) and reduces enterprise integration friction. Interop is delivered via RADIUS/IdP integrations and published profiles; no chain changes required.

Security Testing and Continuous Hardening: We don’t assume our design is perfect – we rigorously test it. The Authra team runs penetration tests and “red team” drills regularly. This includes:

• Attempting to spoof location or QoE proofs with various hacks (GPS spoofing apps, sensor manipulation). Our multi-signal approach (cross-verifying cell, WiFi, GPS data) and TEE signatures are tested to ensure they catch these  .

• Simulating Sybil attacks where thousands of fake virtual devices try to join the network. We verify that our Sybil detection AI (discussed later) flags these and that consensus rules (e.g. requiring diverse sources for data confirmation) mitigate their impact .

• Ensuring resilience to mobile OS changes – for example, if Android or iOS change background process policies or require new permissions, we adapt (we maintain close adherence to Google/Apple guidelines and have contingency to partner with popular apps to embed our SDK if standalone background services become too restricted). 

• Testing failure modes: if the blockchain is temporarily unreachable (say the L2 is down for maintenance), our infrastructure queues data and later commits it without loss. If connectivity is patchy, the device stores proofs until a connection is available.

All background collection respects OS energy and privacy policies; telemetry rates adapt dynamically and pause under low-power or restricted-activity conditions. We combine blockchain innovation with the rigorous engineering and compliance standards of enterprise software. By relentlessly testing and fortifying each component, Authra aims to be battle-tested and trustworthy even for the most security-conscious users.